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CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE STATE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS FOR SECTION 1983 CLAIMS AFTER 
WILSON V. GARCIA: A THEORY APPLIED TO 
MARYLAND LAW 
Stephen J. Shapirot 
Forty-two U.S. C section 1983 provides individuals with a 
federal cause of action for violations of their constitutional rights 
by persons acting under color of state law. The statute itself con-
tains no limitations period for the filing of suits and, in keeping 
with settled federal practice, the lower federal courts have looked 
to state law to determine the proper limitations period. Because 
the lower courts adopted various inconsistent approaches to de-
termining the appropriate state limitations period, the Supreme 
Court, in Wilson v. Garcia, held in 1985 that the federal courts 
should adopt the state limitations period for personal injury ac-
tions. In approximately half of the states, however, there are two 
limitations periods for personal injury actions: a shorter period 
for certain named intentional torts and a longer period for the 
residue of personal injury actions. The lower federal courts have 
split on the question of which of the two limitations periods 
should be applied. This article examines the rationale employed 
by the courts in selecting either the shorter or longer limitations 
period. The article then presents a theory that supports adoption 
of the longer, general personal injury limitations period rather 
than the shorter limitations period applicable to intentional torts. 
The article concludes with the application of this theory to Mary-
land statutory law. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Forty-two U.S.C. section 1983 (section 1983)1 provides individuals 
with a federal cause of action for violations of their constitutional and 
other federal statutory rights by persons acting under color of state law.2 
t B.A., 1971, Haverford College; J.D., 1976, University of Pennsylvania School of 
Law; Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Originally, section 1983 was part of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of 
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be con-
sidered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
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Since the revival of the section 1983 cause of action in the 1960's, 3 federal 
courts have struggled to determine the proper statute of limitations for 
such actions. The judiciary has had to address the question because 
there is neither a statute of limitations contained in the text of section 
1983 nor a federal statute of limitations specifically applicable to such 
actions.4 Generally, when Congress fails to establish a statute of limita-
tions for a federal cause of action, the settled federal practice has been to 
adopt a state limitations period, provided the state limitations period is 
not inconsistent with federal law or policy. 5 With regard to section 1983 
and the other reconstruction civil rights statutes, Congress specifically 
has endorsed the adoption of state law where there is no federal rule by 
enacting 42 U.S.C. section 1988.6 
Before Wilson v. Garcia/ the Supreme Court had held that federal 
courts must choose "the most appropriate''8 or "the most analogous"9 
3. Early Supreme Court cases interpreting the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts had 
given these statutes a very narrow reach. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167 ( 1961 ), however, the Court held that the section 1983 remedy was supplemen-
tary to any state tort remedy, and that a plaintiff could bring a federal lawsuit re-
gardless of whether relief might be available under state law. /d. at 183. The 
Monroe decision has led to a revival of the section 1983 suit that some commenta-
tors have refered to as a "flood" or "explosion" of such suits. Whitman, Constitu-
tional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1980); McCormack, Federalism and Section 
1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 
VA. L. REV. 1 (1974). 
4. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985). 
5. /d. at 266-67 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)); Auto Workers v. 
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154 (1905); 
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895). 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). This statute provides, in part: 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district 
courts by the provisions of this Title, and ofTitle "CIVIL RIGHTS," and 
of Title "CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States 
in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and en-
forced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws 
are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are 
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to 
furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common 
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State 
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is 
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws 
of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the 
trial and disposition of the cause .... 
42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1982). 
Thus, section 1988 requires the courts to follow federal law if applicable. If no 
federal rule exists, then the applicable state law should be followed, unless the state 
law is inconsistent with the Constitution or federal law. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 
U.S. 42, 47 (1984). Courts have adopted two solutions if the applicable state law is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or federal law. The court may choose another 
state law. Id. at 55. Alternatively, the court may create a federal common law rule. 
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978). 
7. 471 u.s. 261 (1985). 
8. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). 
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state statute of limitations for Civil Rights Act claims. The Court, how-
ever, provided little guidance regarding the mechanics of selecting the 
most appropriate or most analogous statute. 1° Courts generally took one 
of two approaches.'' The first was a case-by-case approach in which the 
court would examine the facts of each section 1983 claim and apply the 
statute of limitations of the state law cause of action most analogous to 
that particular section 1983 claim. 12 This approach led to uncertainty 
and litigation because most section 1983 claims can be analogized to 
more than one state law cause of action, each of which may be governed 
by a different statute of limitations. 13 The other approach was to choose 
the state law cause of action most analogous to section 1983 claims and 
apply the statute of limitations for that cause of action to all section 1983 
claims brought within the state. 14 Although this approach provided uni-
formity within a state, results varied from state to state because the fed-
eral circuits were able to analogize section 1983 claims to different state 
causes of action. 1s 
In an attempt to bring uniformity to this unsettled area of the law, 
the Supreme Court held in Wilson that federal courts should select, in 
each state, "the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 
claims." 16 After reviewing the nature and purpose of section 1983 
claims, the Court concluded that the most appropriate statute would be 
the statute applicable for personal injury tort actions. 17 The Court's ef-
fort to provide a uniform approach via this formula has been foiled, how-
ever, because many states do not have a single limitations period 
applicable to all personal injury actions. Approximately one-half of the 
states have one statute of limitations applicable to most personal injury 
actions, and a second, shorter statute of limitations applicable to certain 
9. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980). 
10. "[T]he Supreme Court has been singularly unhelpful in providing guidance on this 
important issue of federal law." Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643 (lOth Cir. 
1984). 
11. For a circuit-by-circuit review on this question, see Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 
643-48 (lOth Cir. 1984). See also Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate 
Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 440, 442-
43 (1986). 
12. See Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1974) (en bane) (court should apply 
the limitations period "which would be applicable in the courts of the state in which 
the federal court is sitting had an action seeking similar relief been brought under 
state law."); accord Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. 
Dailey, 479 F.2d 86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009 (1973). 
13. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272-73. 
14. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1000 (1982); Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972). 
15. See, e.g., Pauk, 654 F.2d at 866 (all section 1983 claims treated as actions on a 
liability created by statute); Almond, 459 F.2d at 204 (all section 1983 claims char-
acterized as claims for personal injuries). 
16. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275. 
17. Jd. at 276. The Court then affirmed the use of a three-year statute of limitations 
governing actions "for injury to the person or reputation of any person." /d. at 280 
(citing N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 37-1-8 (1978)). 
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named intentional torts. 18 Among these states, federal courts have 
18. Twenty-seven states have a statute of limitations for certain intentional torts differ-
ent than the statute of limitations for most other personal injury actions. In all of 
these states except Alabama, the limitations period for intentional torts is the 
shorter of the two. States with such dual limitations periods include: Alabama: 
ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(1) (Supp. 1986) (two years for "any injury to the person or 
rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated"), ALA. 
CODE § 6-2-34(1) (1977) (six years "for any trespass to person or liberty, such as 
false imprisonment or assault and battery"); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12-542 (Supp. 1986) (two years for "injuries done to the person of another"), 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-541 (1956) (one year for malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment, libel, or slander); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 37-201 (Supp. 1985) 
(one year for assault and battery, false imprisonment, libel, and slander, alienation 
of affection or criminal conversation), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-206 (1962) (three 
years for "all actions ... founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability"); Dis-
trict of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN.§ 12-301(4) (1981) (one year for libel, slander, 
assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false 
imprisonment), D.C. CoDE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1981) (three years for all other ac-
tions "for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed"); Kansas: KAN. 
STAT. ANN.§ 60-514(2) (1983) (one year for assault, battery, malicious prosecution, 
or false imprisonment), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5l3(a)(4) (1983) (two years for in-
jury to "the rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated"); 
Kentucky: KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 4l3.l40(l)(c),(d) (Baldwin 1979) (one year for 
malicious prosecution, arrest, criminal conversation, conspiracy, seduction, libel, or 
slander), KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 413.120(7) (Baldwin 1979) (five years for an "in-
jury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumer-
ated"); Maryland: Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CODE ANN.§ 5-105 (1984) (one year for 
assault, battery, libel, or slander), Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 5-101 
(1984) (three years for all civil actions unless "another provision of the Code" ap-
plies); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753 (1980) (two years for assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, or malpractice), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14, § 752 (1980) (six years for "all civil actions ... except as otherwise specially 
provided"); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5805(2),(3),(7) (West 
1987) (two years for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, 
one year for libel and slander), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(8) (West 
1987) (three years for "injury to a person or property"); Mississippi: Miss. CODE 
ANN. § 15-1-35 (Supp. 1986) (one year for assault, assault and battery, maiming, 
false imprisonment, malicious arrest, menace, libel, or slander), Miss. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-l-49 (Supp. 1986) (six years for "all actions which no other period of limita-
tions is prescribed"); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-208 (1985) (one year for 
libel, slander, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution), 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-207(3) (1985) (four years for "an injury to the rights of the 
plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated"); New Jersey: 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:l4-3 (West 1952) (one year for libel and slander), N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:l4-2 (West 1952) (two years for "injury to the person caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect or default of any person"); New York: N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & 
R. § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (one year for assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
malicious prosecution, libel, slander, and violation of privacy), N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. 
& R. § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (three years for "personal injury" actions); 
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § l-54(3) (1983) (one year for libel, slander, as-
sault, battery, or false imprisonment), N.C. GEN. STAT. § l-52(5) (1983) (three 
years for "criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of 
another, not arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated"); North Dakota: 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (Supp. 1985) (two years for libel, slander, assault, 
battery, or false imprisonment), N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-0l-16(5) (Supp. 1985) (six 
years for "criminal conversation or any other injury to the person or rights of an-
other not arising upon contract, when not otherwise expressly provided"); Ohio: 
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reached inconsistent results in choosing the most appropriate limitations 
period. Some courts, emphasizing the broad range of section 1983 ac-
tions, have chosen the more general, usually longer limitations period 
applicable to most personal injury actions. 19 Other courts, relying on the 
historical reasons for the enactment of section 1983, the prevention of 
Ku Klux Klan violence, have chosen the special limitations period appli-
cable to intentional torts. 20 To date, the Supreme Court has declined 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.111 (Anderson Supp. 1985) (one year for assault or 
battery), OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2305.10 (Anderson Supp. 1985) (two years for 
any action for "bodily injury"), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson Supp. 
1985) (one year for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or mal-
practice), OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2305.09 (Anderson Supp. 1981) (four years for 
"an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in 
[other sections]"); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1987) 
(one year for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or false impris-
onment), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1987) (two years for "injury 
to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated"); 
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-1-14(a) (1985) (one year for slander), R.I. GEN. 
LAWS§ 9-l-14(b) (1985) (three years for "injuries to the person"); South Carolina: 
S.C. CODE ANN.§ 15-3-550 (Law Co-op 1977) (two years for libel, slander, assault, 
battery, and false imprisonment), S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(5) (Supp. 1986) (six 
years for "criminal conversation or for any other injury to the person or rights of 
another, not arising on contract, not hereinafter enumerated"); South Dakota: S.D. 
CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-15(1) (1984) (two years for libel, slander, assault, 
battery, or false imprisonment), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-13(5) (1984) 
(six years for "criminal conversation or any other injury to the rights of another not 
arising on contract and not otherwise specifically enumerated"); Tennessee: TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 28-3-103 (1980) (six months for slander), TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-
104 (1980) (one year for all other actions for "injury to the person"); Texas: TEx. 
REv. CIV. CODE ANN.§ 16.002 (Vernon 1986) (one year for malicious prosecution, 
libel, or slander), TEX. CIV. CoDE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986) (two years for 
"personal injury"); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-12-29(4) (1977) (one year for li-
bel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction), UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-12-25(2) (1977) (four years for "relief not otherwise provided for by law"); 
Virginia: VA. CoDE§ 8.01-248 (1984) (one year for malicious prosecution or abuse 
of process), VA. CODE § 8.01-243A (Supp. 1986) (two years for actions for "per-
sonal injuries"); Washington: WASH. ·REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.16.100 (1962) (two 
years for libel, slander, assault, assault and battery, or false imprisonment), WASH. 
REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.080(2) (1962) (three years for "injury to the person or 
rights of another not hereinafter enumerated"); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 893.57 (West 1983) (one year for libel, slander, assault, battery, invasion of pri-
vacy, false imprisonment, "or other intentional tort to the person"), Wis. STAT. 
ANN. § 893.54(1) (West 1983) (three years for "injuries to the person"); Wyoming: 
Wvo. STAT.§ l-3-105(v) (1977) (one year for libel, slander, assault, battery, mali-
cious prosecution, or false imprisonment), Wvo. STAT. § l-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1977) 
(four years for any "injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and 
not herein enumerated"). 
19. See, e.g., Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986); Carroll v. 
Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 (1986). 
20. See, e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250 (lith Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
106 S. Ct. 893 (1986); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
106 S. Ct. 1376 (1986); Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2902 (1986). 
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three opportunities to resolve this split among the circuits. 21 
Maryland is one of the states that has a dual limitations period for 
personal injury actions. Most tort claims for personal injuries are gov-
erned by Maryland's three-year general statute of limitations. 22 Actions 
for assault, battery, libel, or slander are subject to a one-year limitations 
period. 23 The Fourth Circuit is yet to rule which of these statutes of 
limitations is most appropriate for section 1983 actions. 
This article proposes that the general three-year limitations period 
should govern section 1983 actions in Maryland. The article first de-
scribes the holding and reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Wilson v. Garcia. It then examines the application of Wilson by lower 
courts in states that have statutory limitations periods that are different 
for negligent torts and intentional torts. The article then develops a the-
ory, consistent with Wilson, that could be applied where states have two 
limitations periods. Finally, the article applies this theory to Maryland's 
statutes of limitations and proposes that, in applying Wilson, the Fourth 
Circuit should adopt Maryland's general three-year statute of limitations 
for all section 1983 actions brought in the state. 
II. WILSON V. GARCIA 
In Wilson v. Garcia, 24 the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action in 
federal district court against a New Mexico state police officer and the 
Chief of the State Police, seeking damages for an allegedly unconstitu-
tional arrest and beating. 25 The complaint was filed two years and nine 
months after the incident occurred. 26 The defendant moved to dismiss 
the complaint, claiming that the action was barred by the two-year limi-
tation period of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act,27 which the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico earlier had held to be applicable to section 1983 
actions brought in that state. 28 The federal district court held that the 
decision of the state supreme court was not controlling because "charac-
terization of the nature of the right being vindicated under section 1983 
is a matter of federal, rather than state, law."29 Instead, the court held 
that all section 1983 actions should be characterized as actions based on 
21. Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 
(1986); Mulligan, 777 F.2d 340; Jones, 763 F.2d 1250. 
22. Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984) (includes all negligent and 
some intentional torts). 
23. Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (1984). 
24. 471 u.s. 261 (1985). 
25. /d. at 263. 
26. /d. 
27. /d. This section provides: "Actions against a governmental entity or a public em-
ployee for torts shall be forever barred, unless such action is commenced within two 
years after the date of the occurrence resulting in loss, injury or death .... " N.M. 
STAT. ANN.§ 41-4-15(A) (1978). 
28. DeVargas v. New Mexico, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982). 
29. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 264 (citing Appendix to Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari). 
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statute. 30 Because New Mexico had no specific statute of limitations gov-
erning statutory claims, the court held that the limitations period of the 
three-year residual statute should be applied. 31 Accordingly, the court 
denied the motion to dismiss. The court, however, certified an interlocu-
tory appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b).32 
After accepting the interlocutory appeal and hearing the case en 
bane, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss. 33 The reasoning 
of the Tenth Circuit, however, was different from the reasoning used by 
the district court. The Tenth Circuit held that, for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations, all section 1983 claims should be characterized as ac-
tions for injuries to personal rights. 34 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit 
applied the New Mexico three-year limitations period applicable to per-
sonal injury actions,35 and held that the complaint had been filed in a 
timely manner. 
Recognizing the confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.36 After concluding that 42 U.S.C. section 1988 di-
rects courts to adopt a local limitations period for section 1983 actions, 
the Court considered two questions in determining the most appropriate 
statute of limitations for this claim. The Court first considered whether 
state or federal law governs the characterization of section 1983 claims 
for statute of limitations purposes. 37 The Court concluded that Congress 
intended the characterization of section 1983 claims to be measured by 
federal rather than state standards because of the need for uniform law.38 
The Court then considered "whether all § 1983 claims should be charac-
terized in the same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently 
depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal theories 
presented in each individual case."39 The Court observed that, histori-
cally, state limitations periods for analogous state causes of action were 
adopted to honor the state's balancing of the policies of repose with the 
policies of enforcement embodied in the state cause of action.40 The 
Court recognized, however, that because section 1983 is a uniquely fed-
eral remedy41 that can override certain state laws, it can have no precise 
30. !d. 
31. !d. at 280. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 37-1-4 (1978) provides: "all other actions not herein 
otherwise provided for and specified [must be brought] within four years." 
32. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 264. 
33. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (lOth Cir. 1984). 
34. !d. 
35. !d. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978) provides: "Actions ... for an injury to the 
person or reputation of any person [must be brought] within three years." 
36. Wilson v. Garcia, 469 U.S. 815 (1984). 
37. 471 U.S. at 268. 
38. !d. at 270 (quoting Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting)). 
39. !d. at 268. 
40. !d. at 271. 
41. !d. at 271-72 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972)). 
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counterpart in state law.42 Therefore, the Court concluded that analo-
gies to state or common law causes of action "are bound to be 
imperfect. "43 
This recognition caused the Court to determine that a single, broad 
characterization of all section 1983 claims is best suited to the statute's 
remedial purpose. 44 A broad characterization avoids the problems of un-
certainty and time-consuming litigation that had been plaguing the case-
by-case approach.45 The Court found that the case-by-case approach 
had proved unsatisfactory because many section 1983 claims are analo-
gous to more than one of the common law causes of action, each of 
which may be governed by a different limitations period.46 In that re-
gard, the Court catalogued the many diverse constitutional claims that 
could form the basis for section 1983 suits, finding that two or more peri-
ods of limitations could apply to each section 1983 claim.47 The Court 
concluded that in the interests of uniformity, certainty, and the minimi-
zation of unnecessary litigation, 48 section 1988 should be construed as a 
directive for federal courts to select, in each state, the single most appro-
priate statute of limitations for all section 1983 claims.49 
The Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that for purposes of the 
statute of limitations, all section 1983 claims should be treated as tort 
actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries. 50 According to 
the Court, the choice of this limitations period was "supported by the 
nature of the section 1983 remedy, and by the federal interest in ensuring 
that the borrowed period of limitations not discriminate against the fed-
eral civil rights remedy." 51 In reaching this decision, the Court reviewed 
the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which Congress had passed to 
counter the violent acts committed against southern blacks by the Ku 
Klux Klan. The Court observed that the "atrocities that concerned Con-
gress in 1871 plainly sounded in tort. " 52 Although the Court acknowl-
edged that section 1983 encompasses a broad range of potential tort 
analogies, ranging from injury to property to infringements of individual 
liberty, 53 the Court reasoned that Congress would have considered sec-
tion 1983 remedies to be more analogous to personal injury claims than 
to claims for property damage or breach of contract. 54 Therefore, the 
Court determined that had the Forty-Second Congress considered the 
42. Id. at 272 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196, n. 5 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
43. Id. at 272. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 272-73. 
47. Id. at 273-74. 
48. Id. at 275. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 276. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 277. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
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issue, "it would have characterized § 1983 as conferring a general rem-
edy for injuries to personal rights. " 55 
After choosing to characterize section 1983 claims as claims for per-
sonal injury, the Court explained that periods of limitation for statutory 
claims and for state law remedies for wrongs committed by public offi-
cials were inappropriate for section 1983 claims. As to statutory claims, 
the Court determined that, because statutory claims were relatively 
scarce when section 1983 was enacted, it is unlikely that Congress would 
have intended to apply these subsequently enacted periods of limitations 
to statutory claims. 56 As for state law causes of action for wrongs com-
mitted by public officials, the Court reasoned that such a characterization 
might allow the state to thwart the federal remedy by selecting a shorter 
statute of limitations for such claims. 57 
The Wilson Court's express purpose in ruling that there should be 
one limitations period in each state for section 1983 actions was to avoid 
the uncertainty and litigation caused by the case-by-case approach. The 
Court sought to achieve uniformity within each state, doctrinal consis-
tency from state to state, and a limitations period on par with a major 
part of each state's civil litigation. 58 The Court recognized that the in-
consistency of having the section 1983 limitations period vary from state 
to state could not be avoided because Congress had determined that state 
law should apply even though the limitations period for personal injury 
/d. 
The unifying theme of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is reflected in the 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment that unequivocally recognizes the 
equal status of every "person' subject to the jurisdiction of any of the sev-
eral States. The Constitution's command is that all "persons' shall be ac-
corded the full privileges of citizenship; no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law or be denied the equal 
protection of the laws. A violation of that command is an injury to the 
individual rights of the person. (footnote omitted). 
55. /d. at 278. 
56. /d. Moreover, the Court took the position that most section 1983 claims are not 
actually statutory claims at all. "Section 1983, of course, is a statute, but it only 
provides a remedy and does not itself create any substantive rights." /d. Although 
a few section 1983 claims are based on statute, most are based on Constitutional 
rights. The Court noted: "These guarantees of liberty are among the rights pos-
sessed by every individual in a civilized society, and not privileges extended to the 
people by the legislature." /d. at 278-79. 
57. In this regard, the Court stated: 
The characterization of all § 1983 actions as involving claims for per-
sonal injuries minimizes the risk that the choice of a state statute of limita-
tions would not fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by § 1983. 
General personal injury actions, sounding in tort, constitute a major part 
of the total volume of civil litigation in the state courts today, and proba-
bly did so in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted. It is most unlikely that the 
period of limitations applicable to such claims ever was, or ever would be, 
fixed in a way that would discriminate against federal claims, or be incon-
sistent with federal law in any respect. 
!d. at 279. 
58. /d. at 275. 
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actions might vary between the states. 59 Despite this inherent problem, 
the Court hoped to achieve at least a settled limitations period within 
each state. The Court failed to anticipate, however, that in some states 
the lower federal courts would have difficulty in choosing the state limi-
tations period for personal injuries due to the existence of two limitations 
periods. 
III. CONFUSION IN APPLYING WILSON V. GARCIA 
Generally, federal courts in states where one statute of limitations 
applies to all claims for personal injury have applied the rule of Wilson v. 
Garcia with ease. 60 Where states have differing limitations periods de-
pending upon whether the personal injury aro~e from negligent or inten-
tional conduct, however, the federal courts have had difficulty in 
applying the Wilson rule. Approximately one-half of the states have one 
statute of limitations for certain named intentional torts and a second 
statute of limitations for all other claims of injuries to personal rights. 61 
Some courts have applied the limitations period for intentional torts on 
the theory that section 1983 was enacted to counter the intentionally tor-
tious conduct of the Ku Klux Klan. 62 Other courts, emphasizing the 
59. The only way to achieve complete uniformity of statutes of limitations in all section 
1983 cases regardless of the state in which the action is brought is for Congress to 
amend 28 U.S.C. § 1988 and to provide by statute a single limitations period for all 
section 1983 claims. Commentators have recommended such amendment. See 
Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of Limitations for Section 
1983 Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 440, 452 (1986). Congress, however, has 
refused to enact a number of bills that would have adopted a uniform statute of 
limitations for all section 1983 actions. See, e.g., S. 436, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1985); S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 12874, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1976). 
60. See, e.g., Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1986) (one-year period under 
Tennessee law); McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(one-year period under California law); DeNardo v. Murphy, 781 F.2d 1345 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (Alaska two-year period); Knoll v. Springfield Township School Dist., 
763 F.2d 584 (3rd Cir. 1985) (Pa. two-year period). 
A separate area of dispute among the circuits has been whether the Wilson 
opinion should be applied retroactively to cases which have been filed but not de-
cided. Compare Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 
S. Ct. 2902 (1986) (Wilson to be applied retroactively) with Gibson v. United States, 
781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 928 (1987) (Wilson not to be 
applied retroactively to shorten statute of limitations). The Supreme Court recently 
addressed the retroactivity issue in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617 
(1987), a case involving the appropriate statute of limitations for cases brought 
under another civil rights statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1981. After first holding that section 
1981, like section 1983, should be governed by the state statute of limitations for 
personal injury actions, the Court held that the Pennsylvania two-year statute of 
limitations should be applied retroactively, since there had been no "clear prece-
dent" in the state adopting a longer statute. 107 S. Ct. at 2622. 
61. See supra note 18. 
62. Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250 (lith Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct 
893 (1986); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
1376 (1986); Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. 
Ct 2902 (1986). 
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broad range of present day section 1983 claims, have applied the more 
general tort statute. 63 
This confusion never would have arisen had the Supreme Court cho-
sen to grant certiorari, not to Wilson, but to one of two other cases de-
cided by the Tenth Circuit the same year as Wilson: Hamilton v. City of 
Overland Park 64 and Mishmash v. Murray City. 65 In Wilson, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that for statute of limita-
tions purposes, all section 1983 cases should be treated as actions for 
injury to personal rights.66 The states in which the two other Tenth Cir-
cuit actions were filed, however, had more than one statute of limitations 
for personal injury actions. In Hamilton, a case arising in Kansas, the 
Tenth Circuit had to choose between two statutorily prescribed limita-
tions periods for personal injury. In Kansas, a one-year limitations pe-
riod applies to actions for "assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or 
false imprisonment,"67 whereas a two-year limitations period applies to 
actions for "injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and 
not herein enumerated."68 The Tenth Circuit chose to apply the latter, 
two-year statute of limitations on the ground that "all section 1983 
claims should be characterized as actions for injury to the rights of an-
other."69 In Mishmash, a case arising in Utah, the court also was con-
fronted with two statutes of limitations for personal injury actions: a 
one-year statute which governs actions for "libel, slander, assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment or seduction,"70 and a four-year statute for all 
personal torts not specifically mentioned in the one-year statute.71 Be-
cause the court found no Utah statute "expressly applicable to actions for 
injury to the rights of another,"72 it applied the four-year statute of limi-
tations. 73 Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari in either Hamilton 
or Mishmash, it would have had to address the issue of which personal 
injury statute of limitations should be applied in situations where there 
are two limitations periods under state law. Courts in states with two 
limitations periods, one for intentional torts and one for other torts, 
63. Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 296 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986); accord Carroll v. Wil-
kerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 (1986). 
64. Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 
u.s. 1052 (1985). 
65. Mishmash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1052 (1985). Hamilton and Mishmash were appealed to the Supreme Court at ap-
proximately the same time as Wilson. The Court denied certiorari in those cases the 
same week it issued the Wilson opinion. 
66. Wilson, 469 U.S. at 276. 
67. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-514(2) (1983). 
68. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-513(a)(4) (1983). 
69. Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613,614 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
471 u.s. 1052 (1985). 
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29(4) (1977). 
71. Mishmash, 730 F.2d at 1367. 
72. /d. 
73. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(2) (1977). 
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would have been provided with clear guidance in determining which lim-
itations period to apply in section 1983 actions. 
The first court to address the limitations' problem after Wilson was 
the Eleventh Circuit in Jones v. Preuit & Mau/din. 74 In Jones, the court 
was forced to choose between two Alabama statutes of limitations. A six 
year limitations period applied to actions "for any trespass to person or 
liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and battery."75 A one-year 
statute applied to actions for "any injury to the person or rights of an-
other not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this 
section."76 The court recognized that not all section 1983 claims re-
dressed intentional deprivations of constitutional rights and that some 
section 1983 claims will sound in trespass and others in trespass on the 
case.77 The court decided to apply the six-year trespass statute, which 
covered most intentional torts, because "personal injuries sounding in 
trespass make up the most significant subset of claims within Section 
1983."78 The court observed that the typical personal injuries covered by 
the statute, those that motivated the Congressional enactment, were acts 
of intentional and direct violence on the part of the Ku Klux Klan. 79 
The court held, therefore, that the longer statute of limitations period 
applied and that, consequently, the suit was not time barred. 80 
It is unfortunate that Jones was the first case to reach the federal 
courts after Wilson. The Alabama statutes at issue in Jones provided a 
significantly longer statute of limitations for intentional torts than for 
negligent torts. In every other state, however, the limitations period for 
intentional torts is shorter than that provided for negligent torts. 81 Some 
courts deciding subsequent cases, however, have tended to follow the 
Jones rationale despite this significant distinction. 
Gates v. Spinks, 82 the next case to address this issue, is illustrative of 
this tendency. In Gates, the Fifth Circuit had to decide which of two 
Mississippi statutes of limitations to apply. The Fifth Circuit expressly 
74. 763 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1985). 
75. ALA. CODE § 6-2-34(1) ( 1975). The Alabama courts had applied this six-year limi-
tations period to what had been trespass actions under the common Jaw, that is, 
intentional acts done with force and immediately injurious to the person or property 
of another. C.O. Osborn Contracting Co. v. Alabama Gas Corp., 273 Ala. 6, 135 
So. 2d 227 (1961). 
76. ALA. CoDE § 6-2-39(a)(5) (1975). This statute was repealed in 1985 and replaced 
with a two-year statute, now codified at ALA. CODE § 6-2-38( I) (Supp. 1986 ). The 
one-year limitations period has been applied to actions for trespass on the case, 
defined as a wrongful act causing harm only indirectly or without an intentional act 
of force. Smith & Santon Funeral Directors v. Dean, 262 Ala. 600, 80 So. 2d 222 
(1958); Jones, 763 F.2d at 1254 n.4 (citing W.T. Ratliff Co. v. Henley, 405 So. 2d 
141 (Ala. 1981)). 
77. Jones, 763 F.2d at 1255. 
78. /d. 
79. /d. 
80. /d. at 1256. 
81. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (lOth Cir. 1984). 
82. 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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adopted the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Jones and chose to apply 
a one-year statute, which it found applicable to most, if not all, common 
law intentional torts, 83 rather than a six-year residual statute governing 
most unintentional tort actions, including negligence actions and most 
strict liability actions. 84 The court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's 
reasoning that Congress's intent in enacting section 1983 was to stem 
intentional violence. 85 The Fifth Circuit did not confine itself to this his-
torical analysis, however. The court focused on the broader range of 
present day section 1983 actions and stated that "[m]ost 1983 actions are 
predicated on intentional rather that negligent acts."86 
Although the holding and reasoning of Jones and Gates are similar, 
the results necessarily differ because of the difference between Alabama 
and Mississippi law. As noted above, Alabama law is quite unusual in 
that the statute of limitations for intentional torts is longer than the limi-
tations period for negligent torts. 87 In Mississippi, as in every other state 
with dual limitations periods, the limitations period for intentional torts 
is significantly shorter than that for other torts. If courts in those states 
find that the statute of limitations for intentional torts is the appropriate 
statute for section 1983 actions, the result would be a comparatively 
short limitations period for section 1983 actions. 88 
Although both the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits applied the limita-
tions period for intentional torts, the First Circuit took a different ap-
proach in Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast. 89 In determining which of 
Maine's statutes of limitations should apply to section 1983 actions, the 
First Circuit decided not to apply Maine's two-year limitations period for 
the intentional torts of assault and battery, and for false imprisonment, 
slander, libel, and malpractice of physicians. 90 Instead, the court applied 
83. Jd. at 919. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (1972) provided that "all actions for as-
sault, assault and battery, maiming, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, or men-
ace, and all actions for slanderous words concerning the person or title, and for 
libels, shall be commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued, 
and not after." 
84. Gates, 771 F.2d at 919 (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1972) (six year residual 
statute)). The court affirmed the dismissal of the case because it was not filed within 
one year of the accrual of the cause of action. Gates, 771 F.2d at 920. 
85. Jd. at 919. "There is no room for disagreement with the Eleventh Circuit that '[t]he 
paradigmatic personal injuries covered by the statute, those that motivated the Con-
gress to take action, were acts of intentional and direct violence on the part of the 
Ku Klux Klan.'" Id. (quoting Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 713 F.2d 1250, 1255 
(lith Cir. 1985)). 
86. Id. at 920. 
87. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
88. Of the twenty-seven states that have a different statute of limitations for intentional 
torts than for other personal injury actions, twenty have a limitations period for 
intentional torts of one year or less. In twenty-five of the twenty-seven states with 
dual limitations periods, the period for intentional torts is either one-half or one-
third the length of the period for other personal injury actions. See supra notes 60-
87 and accompanying text. 
89. 796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986). 
90. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753 (1964). 
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Maine's six-year limitations period used for virtually all other personal 
injury claims.91 In choosing Maine's longer unintentional tort limita-
tions period, the First Circuit focused on the present day myriad assort-
ment of section 1983 claims92 rather than on the historical basis for 
section 1983 claims. According to the First Circuit, the Supreme Court 
had characterized section 1983 claims as personal injury claims "in an 
effort to encompass the broad range of potential tort analogies section 
1983 has been used to invoke. "93 
Nevertheless, not all courts faced with a statutory scheme similar to 
Maine's have reached the same result. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has 
reached seemingly inconsistent results when faced with similar state stat-
utes. In Mulligan v. Hazard, 94 one Sixth Circuit panel applied Ohio's 
one-year statute applicable to actions for libel, slander, assault, battery, 
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or malpractice,95 rather than 
the two-year statute applicable to actions "for personal injury."96 As had 
the Eleventh Circuit in Jones and Gates,97 this panel looked to the histor-
ical basis for section 1983 and reached the conclusion that the statute 
applicable to actions involving assaults and batteries "more specifically 
encompasses the sorts of actions which concerned Congress as it enacted 
the civil rights statutes."98 In Carroll v. Wilkerson, 99 however, a different 
Sixth Circuit panel applied Michigan's three-year statute of limitations 
91. Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 546-47 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (1964)): 
All civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of 
action accrues and not afterwards, except actions on a judgment or decree 
of any court of record of the United States, or of any state or of a justice of 
the peace in this State, and except as otherwise specially provided. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (1964). The court, therefore, reversed the dis-
missal of a police officer's suit for deprivation of his property interest in his position 
without due process. Small, 796 F.2d at 550. 
92. Small, 796 F.2d at 546. 
93. !d. The court noted that the Supreme Court in Wilson had listed many examples of 
the "numerous and diverse topics and subtopics" that had been the subject of sec-
tion 1983 suits. !d. (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 273). The court stated: 
These suits are not easily characterized as "trespass" claims or "tres-
pass on the case" claims, nor does the "intentional" - "unintentional" di-
chotomy contribute to the analysis of many claims, such as those based on 
challenged legislation or regulations. These suits are not primarily or even 
nearly analogous to assault and battery, false imprisonment, or defama-
tion. At best, these suits can only be characterized very generally as 
claims involving "personal injuries." 
Small, 796 F.2d at 546. 
94. 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2902 (1986). 
95. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson 1981). This statute has been 
amended. See supra note 18 for the current versions of the Ohio statutes of 
limitations. 
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2305.10 (Anderson 1981). 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 74-86. 
98. Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2902 
(1986). 
99. 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 (1986). 
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for personal injury claims, 100 even though Michigan had shorter limita-
tions periods for assault, battery, or false imprisonment, 101 malicious 
prosecution, 102 and libel or slander. 103 Although the court was aware of 
the Mulligan decision, 104 it did not discuss the apparent split within the 
circuit on this issue. This discrepancy did not escape Justice White, how-
ever, who used it as the basis of his dissent from the denial of certiorari in 
Carrol/. 105 Justice White would have granted certiorari in order to re-
solve the confusion over which state statute of limitations should be ap-
plied in section 1983 cases when more than one state statute addresses 
such claims. 106 
IV. PROPOSED THEORY 
Courts choosing to apply the statute of limitations for intentional 
torts have emphasized that the Forty-Second Congress, in passing section 
1983, was trying to remedy the intentional violence of the Ku Klux 
Klan. 107 Courts choosing to apply the limitations period for other per-
sonal injury actions have emphasized the broad range of present day sec-
tion 1983 actions. 108 The Supreme Court's opinion in Wilson v. 
Garcia 109 does not clarify which approach should be taken because the 
opinion emphasizes both the historical basis of section 1983 110 and the 
broad range of present day actions. 111 
In Wilson, the Court noted that Congress's purpose in borrowing 
the appropriate state statute of limitations for section 1983 claims was to 
incorporate "the State's judgment on the proper balance between the pol-
icies of repose and the substantive policies of enforcement embodied in 
the state cause of action." 112 If the goal of section 1988 is to honor each 
state's judgment regarding limitations periods, the statute of limitations 
should be based on the type of cases that actually are being brought 
under section 1983, rather than on the type of case that Congress had 
thought might be brought when it enacted the statute more than a hun-
dred years ago. 1 13 
100. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(8) (West 1986). 
101. !d. § 600.5805(2) (West 1986) (two years). 
102. /d. § 600.5805(3) (West 1986) (two years). 
103. /d. § 600.5805(7) (West 1986) (one year). 
104. The Carroll court followed the Mulligan court's decision to apply Wilson retroac-
tively. Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 45 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 330 
( 1986). 
105. County of Wayne v. Carroll, 107 S. Ct. 330, 330 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
106. /d. at 330 (White, J., dissenting). 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97. 
109. 471 u.s. 261 (1985). 
110. /d. at 275, 276, 278. 
Ill. /d. at 273. 
112. /d. at 271. 
113. "When § 1983 was enacted [more than 100 years ago], it is unlikely that Congress 
actually foresaw the wide diversity of claims that the new remedy would ultimately 
embrace." /d. at 275. 
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If the broader range of modern day section 1983 claims is used for 
analogy, the most "analogous" statute of limitations in most states 
should be that of general personal injury actions rather than that of in-
tentional torts. 114 In the overwhelming majority of states with dual limi-
tations periods for personal injury actions, certain named intentional 
torts are subject to a shorter statute of limitations, while all other per-
sonal injury actions are subject to a longer limitations period. 115 In such 
states, the limited number of named intentional torts would not seem to 
be most analogous to the broad range of present day section 1983 actions. 
The number of intentional torts covered by the specific statute varies 
from state to state. The most narrow statutes cover only slander, or libel 
and slander, 116 and obviously would not be most analogous to all section 
1983 claims. A more typical statute covers libel, slander, assault, bat-
tery, and either or both malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. 117 
The broader the coverage of the intentional tort statute, the stronger the 
argument that it is the most analogous to section 1983 actions. For ex-
ample, a statute such as that in Maryland, 118 which applies only to ac-
tions for assault, battery, libel, or slander, would cover fewer section 
1983 actions than a statute that also covers malicious prosecution and 
false imprisonment. 119 
It is debatable whether a statute covering a broad range of inten-
tional torts such as assault, battery, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, 
and false imprisonment or a residuary statute of all other personal injury 
actions, is most analogous to section 1983 claims. On the one hand, 
many section 1983 claims, including most of those listed by the Supreme 
Court in Wilson v. Garcia, bear no relationship to intentional torts. 120 
114. Even if the "paradigmatic" section 1983 action contemplated by the 42d Congress is 
chosen to provide the analogy, an argument still can be made, at least in those states 
that have a limitations period applicable to only a few intentional torts, that such 
torts are not the most analogous to section 1983 actions. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 154-55 for an explanation of this argument. 
115. See supra note 18, for a compilation of all states with dual statutes of limitations for 
torts. 
116. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 1952); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14(a) 
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-103 (1980). 
117. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805 (Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 25-208 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 1-54(3) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-01-18 
(Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-3-550 (Law Co-op 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 15-2-15 (1984); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN.§ 4.16.100 (1962); WYO. STAT.§ l-3-105(v) (1977). 
118. See, e.g., Mo. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (1984). 
119. See supra states listed in note 11 7. 
120. In Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court gave a partial listing of the "numerous and 
diverse topics" covered by section 1983 suits: 
[D]iscrimination in public employment on the basis of race or the exercise 
of First Amendment rights, discharge or demotion without procedural due 
process, mistreatment of schoolchildren, deliberate indifference to the 
medical needs of prison inmates, the seizure of chattels without advance 
notice or sufficient opportunity to be heard -to identify only a few. [foot-
notes omitted]. 
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On the other hand, many section 1983 claims are brought against law 
enforcement officers for excessive use of force and similar claims that are 
analogous to assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Notwithstanding, 
given the Supreme Court's emphasis of the "broad range of potential tort 
anaiogies," 121 it seems that even a fairly broad intentional tort statute is 
not as analogous to section 1983 claims as is a statute that applies to all 
other injuries to the rights of another. 
Another reason exists for choosing the more general personal injury 
statute of limitations over the statute applicable to intentional torts. 
Even in states where it might be argued that the intentional tort statute is 
the most "analogous" to section 1983 claims, it may not be the most 
"appropriate" statute to use. Although the Supreme Court sometimes 
uses the two terms interchangeably, 122 it is unclear whether the most 
analogous statute is always the most appropriate statute. In one case, for 
example, Burnett v. Grafton, 123 the Court indicated that there may be a 
distinction. In Burnett, employees of a Maryland state college brought 
suit under sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, claiming racial discrimi-
nation in employment. The federal district court dismissed the claims as 
barred by the six-month limitations period applicable to a Maryland stat-
ute prohibiting racial discrimination in employment. 124 Without disput-
ing that the state employment discrimination statute was the cause of 
action most analogous to the actual suit being brought by the plain-
tiffs, 125 the Supreme Court refused to apply the six-month limitations 
period for filing an administrative complaint under the state statute to 
the section 1983 claim. The Court held that the state statute was not 
"appropriate" because it failed "to take into account practicalities that 
are involved in litigating federal civil rights claims and policies that are 
analogous to the goals of the Civil Rights Acts." 126 The Court noted 
469 U.S. at 273. With the possible exception of "mistreatment of schoolchildren," 
which might be similar to an assault and battery claim, none of the claims listed by 
the court bear much resemblance to either assault, battery, libel, slander, malicious 
prosecution, or false arrest. 
121. /d. at 277. 
122. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Court spoke of 
using the "most appropriate" statute of limitations. /d. at 462. In Board of Regents 
v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), the Court used the term "most analogous." /d. at 
488. In Wilson, 471 U.S. 261, the Court used both terms together: "the selection of 
'the most appropriate' or 'the most analogous' state statute of limitations to apply to 
this § 1983 claim." /d. at 268. 
123. 468 u.s. 42 (1984). 
124. Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 14 (1929). 
125. Because Burnett was a pre-Wilson case, the courts were searching for the state cause 
of action most analogous to the specific section 1983 claim actually being brought, 
rather than the present task of trying to choose one state statute of limitations for 
all section 1983 claims. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. It was clear that 
the state employment discrimination statute was the most analogous to the federal 
case. 
126. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50. The Court conducted the three-step process for determin-
ing state law under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See supra note 6. The Court determined, 
under the second step, that the six-month period was inappropriate, rather than 
1987] Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Claims 259 
that "[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations period with na-
tional interests in mind," 127 and that the reasons for which a legislature 
chooses a specific limitations period for a state cause of action may not 
apply to section 1983 cases. 128 The Burnett opinion suggests that one 
must analyze the state's reasons for choosing a limitations period for a 
specific cause of action. If those reasons are inconsistent with the goals 
of section 1983, then the statute is not the most appropriate, no matter 
how analogous the two causes of action. 129 
Analyzing a legislature's motives in adopting a particular limitations 
period is exceedingly difficult, however. 130 There is often a paucity of 
legislative history because many statutory schemes for limitations periods 
are recodifications of statutes that have remained virtually unchanged for 
long periods of time. 131 Even modern day state legislative history is 
sparse; for older statutes it is virtually nonexistent. Another difficulty in 
determining a legislature's motives is that, as noted by one commentator, 
the selection of a particular limitations period often "reflects a fairly 
complex mixture of purposes, some of which overlap and some of which 
may be partly inconsistent with others." 132 
The reason usually cited for statutes of limitation is that defendants 
should not be forced to defend lawsuits after the facts have become stale 
and evidence difficult to procure. 133 One reason for designating a short 
holding, under the third step, that it was inconsistent with the Constitution or fed-
eral law. The Court did note, however, that "the second and third steps of the 
§ 1988 inquiry shade into each other." Burnett, 468 U.S. at 53 n.l5. 
127. !d. at 52 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977)). 
128. The Court stated: 
For instance, the length of a limitations period will be influenced by 
the legislature's determination of the importance of the underlying state 
claims, the need for repose for potential defendants, considerations of judi-
cial or administrative economy, and the relationship to other state policy 
goals. To the extent that particular state concerns are inconsistent with, 
or of marginal relevance to, the policies informing the Civil Rights Act, 
the resulting state statute of limitations may be inappropriate for civil 
rights claims. 
Id. at 53. 
129. The clearest example of this situation occurs when a state passes a statute of limita-
tion explicitly applicable to federal civil rights actions. In Johnson v. Davis, 582 
F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978), the Fourth Circuit rejected a one-year Virginia statute of 
limitations expressly applicable to section 1983 claims. This holding was cited with 
approval in Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 53, n.l5. The holding of Wilson v. 
Garcia by implication clearly rejects the use of state statutes of limitations passed 
specifically to apply to section 1983 claims. 
130. See Callahan, Statutes of Limitations- Backround, 16 OHIO ST. L. J. 131 (1955). 
131. Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 
( 1950). For example, the basic Maryland scheme of a one-year limitations period 
for assault, battery, libel, or slander and a three-year period for most other causes of 
action has remained virtually unchanged since it was enacted in 1715. See I Kilty, 
Laws of Maryland, Chap. XXIII, No. II, April 1715. 
132. Callahan, supra note 130, at 132-33. 
133. Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 
(1950). A defendent "ought not to be called on to resist a claim when 'evidence has 
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period of limitations for certain intentional torts may be a legislative de-
termination that evidence in such cases would be forgotten or would be-
come unavailable sooner than evidence in other types of tort actions. If 
this were the case, then one would expect that there would be a shorter 
limitations period for slander, which applies to more easily forgotten spo-
ken words, than for libel, which usually applies to more permanent writ-
ten words. That most of the statutes in question provide the same 
limitations period for libel as for slander134 tends to refute the notion that 
the underlying rationale for the statutes is the transitory nature of evi-
dence. 135 One commentator has suggested that the actual reason for va-
rying periods of limitations, is "the relative favor with which the 
legislature looks upon certain types of claims or certain classes of plain-
tiffs or defendants." 136 Thus, the rationale underlying special statutes 
providing for relatively short periods of a year or less may be simply 
legislative disfavor of the action or a policy in favor of particularly quick 
settlement. 137 
If legislatures in states that have a shorter statute of limitations for 
intentional torts than for most other actions have chosen the shorter pe-
riod of limitations because of disfavor of intentional tort actions, such 
motives would not be appropriate for federal civil rights actions. State 
legislatures may not act to disfavor federal civil rights actions. In fact, 
the Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Garcia, chose personal injury actions as 
the most appropriate analogy for statute of limitations purposes because 
of the "federal interest in ensuring that the borrowed period of limita-
tions not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy." 138 As 
stated by the Court: 
The characterization of all § 1983 actions as involving 
claims for personal injuries minimizes the risk that the choice 
of a state statute of limitations would not fairly serve the fed-
eral interests vindicated by § 1983. General personal injury ac-
tions, sounding in tort, constitute a major part of the total 
volume of civil litigation in the state courts today, and probably 
did so in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted. It is most unlikely 
that the period of limitations applicable to such claims ever 
was, or ever would be, fixed in a way that would discriminate 
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared,'" /d. (quoting 
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). 
134. But see TENN. CODE ANN.§ 28-3-103 (1980); R.I. GEN. LAws§ 9-1-14(b) (1985). 
135. See Callahan, supra note 136, at 134. One also might expect actions for assault, 
where there usually will be no physical evidence of damages to the plaintiff to have a 
shorter limitations period than actions for battery, where plaintiff usually will have 
sufferred some physical harm. This also is not the case. See supra note 18. 
136. Leftar, The New Conflicts-Limitations Act, 35 MERCER L. REV. 461, 470 (1984) 
(quoting Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 
1185-86 (1950)). 
137. Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1180 
(1950). 
138. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). 
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against federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law m 
any respect. 139 
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Intentional torts, however, do not constitute "a major part of the 
total volume of civil litigation" 140 in the courts. In many states, inten-
tional torts have been given statutes of limitations considerably shorter 
than those for most other actions, including all other personal injury ac-
tions. Of the twenty-seven states having limitations periods different for 
intentional torts than for other personal injury actions, all states but one 
provide a limitations period for intentional torts that is significantly 
shorter than that provided for other personal injury actions. 141 Choosing 
such statutes of limitation discriminates against federal civil rights ac-
tions by treating them as clearly disfavored, rather than typical state 
causes of action. 
The narrower the class of intentional torts singled out by the state 
for inclusion in the shorter statute of limitations, the more discriminatory 
the result. 142 Even a statute such as Mississippi's, however, which 
prescribes a shorter than usual limitations period for most, if not all, 
intentional torts, is not the broad statute of limitations the Wilson Court 
thought it was adopting by choosing the limitations period for personal 
injury actions. If the shorter limitations period were chosen by the state 
legislature because of a hostility toward intentional tort actions, or in an 
effort to give defendants in such actions a limited exposure to liability, 143 
then such limitations periods should not be chosen for section 1983 
actions. 
In summary, courts faced with choosing between a limitations peri-
ods for certain intentional torts and a limitations period for other per-
sonal injury actions should choose the more general personal injury 
statute. When a state legislature has chosen to grant a shorter limitations 
period for intentional torts than for most other tort actions, then the 
intentional tort statute is neither the most analogous to nor the most 
appropriate statute of limitations for section 1983 actions. The narrower 
the list of intentional torts and the greater the discrepancy in limitation 
periods between intentional torts and all other torts, the stronger the ar-
gument that the intentional tort statute is not the proper choice. 
139. /d. at 279. 
140. /d. 
141. See supra note 18. 
142. This is obviously not intentional discrimination, such as when a state passes a short 
statute of limitations explicitly applicable to section 1983 actions, because the state 
could not have known, when it passed the statute, that it would be applied to federal 
civil rights actions. The discriminatory effect, however, is the same. Johnson v. 
Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978). 
143. This is, of course, another reason why legislatures choose short statutes of limita-
tions. However, awarding defendants in federal civil rights actions only a short 
period before they may obtain repose also does not seem consistent with the policies 
of the Civil Rights Acts, and was, in fact, rejected by the Supreme Court in Burnett 
v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1984). 
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V. APPLICATION TO MARYLAND LAW 
Maryland, like many of the states discussed in this article, has a 
statute of limitations applicable to some intentional torts that is different 
from the limitations period applicable to most other personal injury ac-
tions. Section 5-105 of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides a one-
year limitations period for "assault, battery, libel, or slander." 144 Virtu-
ally all other personal injury actions are governed by Maryland's general 
three-year statute of limitations. 145 Under the theory proposed in the 
preceding section, the three-year statute is both the most analogous and 
most appropriate statute to be applied to section 1983 claims. 
The Maryland intentional tort statute, covering only assault, bat-
tery, libel, and slander, is narrower than any other statute yet confronted 
by the federal courts in this context. Moreover, not only is the statute 
narrow by its terms, the courts have been unwilling to extend the statute 
to other intentional torts. In Hector v. Weglein, 146 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland applied the one-year limitations 
period to a claim for assault and battery, but refused to extend it to 
claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. 
The court applied the general three-year statute to these latter claims. 147 
Similarly, in Robinson v. Vitro Corp., 148 another federal district court 
judge was requested to apply the one-year statute of limitations to an 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because of its alleged 
similarity to the torts enumerated in section 5-105. 149 The court refused, 
citing the policy of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to construe strictly 
the statutes of limitations. 150 Aside from assault and battery, the only 
other tort to which the federal district court in Maryland has been will-
ing to extend section 5-105 is false light invasion of privacy, where, be-
144. "An action for assault, battery, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year from 
the date it accrues." Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (1984). 
145. "A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless 
another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an 
action shall be commenced." Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CoDE ANN.§ 5-101 (1984). 
Most of the other exceptions to the three-year limitations period are not applicable 
to the present situation. See, e.g.,§ 5-102 (twelve-year period for actions on judg-
ments or instruments under seal); § 5-103 (twenty-year period for adverse posses-
sion);§ 5-104 (five-year period for action on public officer's bond); § 5-108 (twenty-
year period for injuries occurring after completion of improvement to realty); § 5-
109 (three-or five-year period for malpractice actions against physicians). 
146. 558 F. Supp. 194 (D. Md. 1982). 
147. /d. at 207. 
148. 620 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Md. 1985). 
149. /d. at 1072. 
I 50. The district court stated: 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has further cautioned that 'where 
the Legislature has not made an exception in express words in the Statute 
of Limitations, the Court cannot allow any implied and equitable excep-
tion to be engrafted upon the Statute merely on the ground that such ex-
ception would be within the spirit or reason of the statute.' 
/d. (quoting McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 160,40 A.2d 313, 
316 (1944)). 
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cause of the overlap with libel and slander, "[t]o hold otherwise would 
allow a plaintiff, in any defamation action where there has been a general 
publication to avoid the otherwise applicable one-year statute merely by 
phrasing the cause of action in terms of invasion of privacy." 151 
If one compares the narrow range of torts covered by section 5-105 
with the wider variety of present day section 1983 actions, it is clear that 
section 5-105 is not the most analogous statute, because it would govern 
only a small fraction of such actions. 152 For this reason, the Maryland 
statute is distinguishable from the intentional tort statutes of Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Ohio, which have been held to be applicable to section 
1983 actions. 153 
Even if section 5-105 is compared with the action with which Con-
gress hoped to counter the intentional and direct violence against south-
ern blacks, it probably still is not the most analogous statute. Although 
many section 1983 actions against the Ku Klux Klan of the 1930's might 
have been for assault and battery, others would have constituted false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, or other intentional torts not covered by 
the Maryland statute. In fact, because section 1983 contains a require-
ment that the defendants act under color of state law, 154 actions to re-
dress directly the assaults committed by the Ku Klux Klan might not 
151. Smith v. Esquire, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 967, 970 (D. Md. 1980). Accord Robinson v. 
Vitro Corp., 620 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (D. Md. 1985). Unlike the traditional inva-
sion of privacy tort that involved statements that were true, the "comparatively 
new" false light invasion of privacy action requires, as does defamation, a false state-
ment. A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 69 n.7 265 A.2d 207, 215 n.7 (1970). 
The only real difference between false light invasion of privacy actions and defama-
tion actions is that the former requires public as opposed to mere private publica-
tion. Hence, many defamation cases also would constitute false light invasion of 
privacy claims, thus justifying the courts' fear that defamation plaintiffs could avoid 
the applicable one-year limitation period merely by renaming their tort. 
152. In Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court stated that the list of claims brought under 
section 1983, 
[W]ould encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics: discrimi-
nation in public employment on the basis of race or the exercise of First 
Amendment rights, discharge or demotion without procedural due pro-
cess, mistreatment of schoolchildren, deliberate indifference to the medical 
needs of prison inmates, the seizure of chattels without advance notice or 
sufficient opportunity to be heard - to identify only a few. 
471 U.S. at 273 (1985). 
153. The Alabama statute applied to "any trespass to person or liberty." Jones v. Preuit 
& Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250, 1254 (lith Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 893 (1986) 
(quoting ALA. CODE § 6-2-39(a)(5) (1975)); the Mississippi statute applied to ac-
tions "for assault, assault and battery, maiming, false imprisonment, malicious 
arrest, or menace, and all actions for slanderous word concerning the person or title, 
and for libels," Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (1972)); the Ohio statute, the narrowest of the three, still 
covered "libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment 
or malpractice." Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson 1983)). 
154. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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always have been available. 155 The section 1983 action envisioned by 
Congress may not have been an assault and battery action against private 
citizens, but an action against public officials or municipalities for en-
couraging or participating in such acts. Although the actions of such 
state defendants usually would be intentional, they would not be limited 
necessarily to assaults and batteries. Therefore, section 5-101, which 
governs virtually all other personal injury actions except for assault, bat-
tery, libel, and slander, seems analogous to present day section 1983 ac-
tions as well as to those section 1983 actions contemplated at its passage. 
Another reason for choosing the three-year period of section 5-101 
over the one-year period of section 5-105 is that the narrow one-year 
limitation is inappropriate for section 1983 actions to the extent that it 
discriminates against federal civil rights actions. As noted above, when a 
state legislature has singled out a few causes of action for shorter limita-
tions periods, there is a strong likelihood that the state disfavors such 
causes of action. 156 The one-year Maryland statute applies only to four 
torts, two of which, libel and slander, are normally disfavored. 157 It may 
be inferred, therefore, that the short limitations period was intended to 
discourage these kinds of claims, not to protect against vanishing evi-
dence. 158 Applying the shorter statute of limitations to section 1983 ac-
tions would be inappropriate inasmuch as the states may not disfavor 
1983 actions. 
The three-year limitations period of section 5-101, which applies to 
the majority of personal injury actions in Maryland, both intentional and 
unintentional, is the more appropriate period to be applied to section 
1983 actions. The Supreme Court in Wilson chose "general personal in-
jury actions" 159 as the most appropriate for section 1983 claims not only 
because they were most analogous to section 1983 claims, but also be-
cause they "constitute a major volume of civil litigation in the state 
courts today, and probably did so in 1871 when§ 1983 was enacted." 160 
By choosing the three-year limitations period of section 5-101, the federal 
courts will be ensuring that federal civil rights plaintiffs will be receiving 
155. Private persons may be held liable under section 1983 only if they conspire with 
governmental officials. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48. 
157. Libel and slander often are considered disfavored actions and given shorter statutes 
of limitations. See Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. 
REv. 1177, 1180 (1950). For more stringent pleading requirements, see 5 WRIGHT 
& MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1245, at 217 (1969) ("the stan-
dard for successfuly pleading defamation tends to be more stringent than ordinary 
civil suits because of the unfavored nature of this type of action"). 
158. There is no actual legislative history available on this point, because the basic Mary-
land statute of limitations scheme has remained virtually unchanged since its origi-
nal passage in 1715. See I Kilty, Laws of Maryland, Chap. XXIII, No. II, April 
1715. 
159. 471 U.S. at 279. 
160. !d. 
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treatment similar to the majority of other plaintiffs suing to redress per-
sonal injuries in the Maryland courts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court failed to resolve the difficul-
ties experienced by the lower federal courts in determining how to select 
the proper state statute of limitations for section 1983 claims. Although 
the Court specified that the proper limitations period should be the state 
limitations period for personal injury actions, this instruction has pro-
vided no guidance in the many states where there are two limitations 
periods for personal injury claims. The lower federal courts continue to 
grapple with this problem and the federal courts of appeals have divided 
on the question. 
A correct reading of the Wilson opinion suggests that, in states with 
dual limitations periods, the longer period for general personal injury 
actions should be selected rather than the shorter period usually allo-
cated for certain named intentional torts. The generalized statutes are 
both more analogous to federal civil rights actions and more appropriate 
for those actions. 
Maryland has a one-year statute of limitations that applies to ac-
tions for assault, battery, libel, and slander and a general three-year limi-
tations period that applies to virtually all other personal injury actions. 
Of the two limitations periods, the three-year statute is most analogous to 
section 1983 actions because it covers the broad range of such actions. 
The three-year statute is also more appropriate than the one-year statute 
because the narrow scope and short limitations period of the one-year 
statute indicates a legislative disfavor that should not be carried over to 
federal civil rights actions. To be consistent with the guidelines set forth 
in Wilson, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
should adopt a three-year limitations period for all section 1983 claims 
and the Fourth Circuit should affirm. 
